EMPLOYER SUBROGATION: THE EFFECT OF
INJURED EMPLOYEE NEGLIGENCE IN
WORKERS' COMPENSATION/
THIRD PARTY ACTIONS

In 1978, Arbaugh v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. applied the doctrine of comparative negligence to direct employer negligence in
workers' compensation/thirdparty actions. Initially, this Comment examines the rule and the rationaleof the Arbaugh holding
in light of the competing policies of workers' compensation and
comparative negligence. Secondly, this Comment proposes that
the Arbaugh rule be applied to injured employee negligence,
making the employer responsiblefor all employment negligence.
Employers would thus be preventedfrom recovering through subrogationprovisions until employer contribution exceeds the percentage of employment negligence.

INTRODUCTION

Presently in California there exists a unique triangular relationship in workers' compensation/thrd party lawsuits.' The relationship between employer and employee is governed by the nofault doctrine of workers' compensation. 2 This allows the employee a guaranteed recovery of compensation benefits regardless
of fault. These benefits are his sole remedy against the employer. 3 After the Li v. Yellow Cab Co.4 decision, the fault concept of comparative negligence governs the relationship between
a third party defendant and an injured employee. The injured
employee may recover from the third party only those damages
which the third party has caused. The employee is not entitled to
1. For the purposes of this Comment, 'third party action" will mean an action involving an employer, an injured employee covered by workers' compensation benefits, and a negligent third party tortfeasor. The negligence of the
employer or the employee will be stated when appropriate.
2. CAL LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1980).
3. Id.
4. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
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a recovery for damages attributable to his own negligence. 5 The
remaining relationship between the employer and the negligent
third party requires the application of both the doctrine of workers' compensation and the doctrine of comparative negligence
through subrogation provisions. 6 The difficulty arises in attempting to apply these two conflicting sets of rules to the same fact situation. This problem is further compounded by the existence of
employer or employee negligence.
This Comment will analyze the progress of the California courts
in resolving how negligence occuring within the scope of employment affects the employer's right of subrogation. Employment
negligence can be found in three ways: 1) direct employer 7 negligence; 2) employer negligence imputed from the negligence of a
co-employee of the injured employee; 8 and 3) imputed employer
negligence from the negligence of the injured employee himself.9
Only the third point has not been settled by the California
Supreme Court. This Comment will propose a solution which will
create employer liability in all areas of employment negligence.
BACKGROUND

The California Labor Code grants a right of subrogation to employers in third party actions.10 Through subrogation, an employer can recoup the amount of an employee's workers'
compensation award from the employee's third party recovery."
The code provides three alternative methods to effect an employer's right: 1) he may bring an action directly against the third
party; 12 2) he may join as a party plaintiff or intervene in an ac5. The apportionment of damages between a negligent injured employee and
a negligent third party continues to be governed by joint and several liability.
Therefore, while a negligent employee will never be able to recover damages due
to his own negligence, application of joint and several liability may in some cases
result in additional liability on the part of the negligent third party. Arbaugh v.
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1978); see text
accompanying notes 38-39 infra.
6. See Note, Third Party and Employer Liability After Nga Li v. Yellow Cab
Companyfor Injuries to Employees Covered by Workers' Compensation,50 S. CAT.
L. REV. 1029 (1977).
7. CAL LAB. CODE § 3300 (West 1971).

8. Id. § 2801.
9. The theory of imputed employer negligence from the negligence of the injured employee was first set forth in Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961). This Comment proposes that the negligence of the injured
employee continue to be imputed to the employer under the doctrine of comparative negligence.
10. CAL LAB. CODE § 3852 (West 1971).

11. Id. § 3856.
12. Id. § 3852.
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tion brought by the employee;I3 or 3) he may allow the employee
to prosecute the third party action and subsequently apply for a
first lien against the amount of the employee's recovery.14
Neither the Labor Code nor its legislative history, however, indicate how the employer's statutory right of subrogation might be
affected by either the employee's or the employer's contributory
negligence.
In 1961, the California Supreme Court decided the landmark
case of Witt v. Jackson.'5 Witt clarified ambiguities in the Labor
Code by holding that an employer would never be entitled to his
right of subrogation if either he or his injured employee were contributorily negligent.16 The case involved two employees (one
negligent, one free of fault), a negligent third party tortfeasor and
a non-negligent employer.' 7 In determining their respective
rights of recovery and reimbursement the court, applying the doctrine of contributory negligence, established two rules.
Initially, the court noted that the lower court, in applying Globe
Indemnity Co. v. Hook,18 had properly imputed the employee negligence to the employer. By imputing the employee negligence
the Witt court found that the employer was a concurrently negligent tortfeasor. Applying the theory that, "[nIo one can take advantage of his own wrong,"19 the court denied the employer his
statutory right to reimbursement of the workers' compensation
funds already paid to the negligent employee.
The court's next holding was more controversial. Using the
same approach, the court also denied the employer's claim of reimbursement for the funds expended to the non-negligent employee. The court concluded that once the employer was found to
be a concurrent tortfeasor he should be considered negligent with
respect to all the parties in the suit. In this manner the negligent
third party and the employer were required to share liability for
13. Id. § 3853.
14. Id. § 3856.
15. 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961).
16. Id.; Lupton, Subrogation: Interpretationof Witt v. Jackson, 41 CAL. S. BAR
J. 690 (1966).
17. Although the employer was actually free from fault, the court found him to
be a concurrent tortfeasor by imputing the negligence of the employee to the employer. Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 650, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 380 (1961).
18. 46 Cal. App. 700, 189 P. 797 (1920).
19. Id.; CAL. CIv. CODE § 3517 (West 1970); see Globe Indemnity v. Hook, 46
Cal. App. 700, 189 P. 797 (1920).

the injuries suffered by the employees. The employer was required to contribute through compensation benefits and the third
party to contribute through payment of the civil judgment assessed against him.
The court's denial of the employer's right of subrogation led to
the second, and perhaps most important rule of Witt: that the
amount already paid in workers' compensation must be deducted
from the employee's third party damages to prevent a double recovery.2 0 In this way the burden of compensating the injured employee was more equitably distributed. The third party was
responsible for any damages left uncompensated by workers'
compensation, the negligent employer was not allowed to take advantage of his own wrong, and the non-negligent employee was
fully compensated but not allowed a double recovery.2 '
The "Witt defense"2 2 enjoyed broad application under the doctrine of contributory negligence, and was frequently used by third
party defendants to reduce the amount of their liability whenever
the employer was a concurrent tortfeasor. In 1975, the "all or
nothing" rule of contributory negligence was replaced by the
more equitable doctrine of comparative negligence in Li v. Yellow
Cab Co.23 The Li case involved two negligent parties. The Li
court held that in negligence cases, the liability of each party
should be determined in direct proportion to fault.24
Although the application of comparative negligence to workers'
compensation/third party actions is not settled, its effect on Witt
v. Jackson25 is clear. The "Witt defense" is not applicable under
comparative negligence. The first holding in Witt, which imputed
the employee negligence to the employer, was made necessary by
the prevailing doctrine of contributory negligence. 2 6 A contrary
holding would have exposed the third party defendant to liability
for damages to the employer despite a finding of non-liability for
damages to the injured employee. 27 The court recognized the in20. Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 360 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961). Because
this money was determined by the court to be unavailable to the employer because of his negligence, the court allowed the third party to take advantage of the
windfall.
21. Id.
22. Kemerer v. Challenge Milk Co., 105 Cal. App. 3d 334, 338, 164 Cal. Rptr. 397

(1980);
23.
24.
25.

See also Note, supra note 6.
13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
Id.
57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1971); but see Comment,

Worker's Compensation/Third-PartyLawsuits: The Inpact of the Li Comparative

Negligence Doctrine, 11 U.S.F. L. REv. 541 (1977).
26. See Kemerer v. Challenge Milk Co., 105 Cal. App. 3d 334 (1980).
27. Under contributory negligence, if the injured party were found to be even
1% negligent he was denied recovery. Thus, in Witt v. Jackson a finding that one

[voL. 18: 301, 1981]

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

consistency inherent in such an approach and acted to place the
employer in the same position with respect to the third party as
the employee. Recovery was not allowed either directly or
through subrogation if a plaintiff employee was found to be even
28
one percent negligent.
Similarly, the second holding, which required an automatic reduction in damages equal to the amount of workers' compensation benefits expended, was also compelled by contributory
negligence. The holding was designed to prevent a double recovery certain to occur in all cases prior to Li where the employee
was free of fault and the employer and a third party were concurrently negligent. A non-negligent employee would be fully compensated by money received from the third party. Any workers'
compensation benefits received would constitute "double recovery"--a recovery in excess of the plaintiff employee's damages.
The court supported a policy that would prohibit double recovery
and yet would not allow a negligent employer 2 9 to recover this
amount through subrogation and thus take advantage of his
wrong. Consequently, under contributory negligence the only alternative was to allolk the third party defendant a windfall by reducing his total liability by the amount of compensation benefits
paid to the injured employee. 30
Both of the holdings in Witt v. Jackson3 1 were necessarily decided under the "all or nothing" rule of contributory negligence.
When this rule was replaced by the doctrine of comparative negligence the Witt holdings ceased to have any practical applicability.
Although the policies set forth in Witt may have continuing vitality after the adoption of comparative negligence, 32 the rules themof the employees was negligent, totally precluded him from receiving any damages
from the third party. If this employee's negligence were not imputed to the em-

ployer, the employer would be entitled to reimbursement from the third party
even though the third party was not liable to the injured employee. Under Witt,
once the employer was considered a concurrent tortfeasor with respect to one of
his employees in the suit he would be considered as such with respect to all injured employees in the suit, whether they were negligent or not Witt v. Jackson,
57 Cal. 57, 73, 366 P.2d 641, 650, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 380 (1961).
28. Id.
29. The employer was not personally negligent. The negligence of his employee was imputed to the employer and he was thereafter considered to be a concurrent tortfeasor.
30. Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961).

31. Id.

32. Id. The policies in Witt are that a negligent employer, even if he is considered as such merely through imputation of his employee's negligence should be

selves retain no independent validity. Given the inapplicability of
Witt, the courts must now re-examine the rights and liabilities of
the parties in workers' compensation/third party actions in light
of the new comparative negligence doctrine.
APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES WHEN EMPLOYER IS NEGLIGENT

The problem in applying comparative negligence to workers'
compensation/third party actions is twofold. First, the underlying
policy in workers' compensation is to guarantee recovery to the
injured worker, irrespective of fault. In exchange for this guaranteed recovery, the duty of the employer to pay is statutorily limited, also irrespective of fault. This scheme is in direct opposition
to the holding of Li which imposes liability in direct proportion to
fault. These conflicting policies must be reconciled to reach an
equitable result in workers' compensation/third party actions.
Second, although the Li case involved only two parties, the
court recognized that additional problems may arise in cases involving multiple tortfeasors. American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court3 3 settled the question of multiple tortfeasors in cases

outside the workers' compensation arena by maintaining joint
and several liability.3 4 Some workable means must be found to

preserve the equity of joint and several liability while maintaining
the goals of workers' compensation. Application of joint and severable liability to workers' compensation/third party actions will
be difficult, primarily because an employer, irrespective of his
negligence, is liable to his injured employee only up to the compensation benefits level. Furthermore, a third party cannot obtain
contribution from an employer, nor can he obtain indemnification,
5
absent a written agreement.3
Adoption of a New Rule
In 1978, the California Court of Appeal in Arbaugh v. Proctor&
Gamble Manufacturing Co. 3 6 recognized the inconsistencies in
applying the fault related doctrine of comparative negligence and
the no-fault doctrine of workers' compensation to the same fact
prevented from taking advantage of his own wrong. To further this policy, the rule
was adopted that the employer cannot be reimbursed the compensation benefits
expended if he is negligent.
33. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 CaL Rptr. 182 (1978).
34. Id.
35. CA. LAB. CODE § 3864 (West 1971).
36. 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1978).
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situation.37 The court acknowledged that the third party could assert the "Witt defense" of employer negligence and thus reduce
his own liability by preventing the employer's recovery under
subrogation. 38 The court pointed out, however, that allowing the
employer either "all or nothing" was inconsistent with Li and
that the "Witt defense" must give way to a more equitable
method of apportionment. The court adopted a rule which balanced the conflicting policies of comparative negligence with the
underlying policies of workers' compensation law. The new rule
stated that the negligent employer was "responsible for either the
difference between the employee's total damages and the amount
received by him from the third party or the total amount of work39
ers' compensation benefits paid, whichever is less."

Under the Arbaugh method of apportionment, the third party
defendant was only responsible for his proportional share of the
damages. 40 To hold the third party defendant liable for damages
he did not cause would be in direct opposition to Li. In those
cases, however, where the employer's statutory compensation
limits are less than his share of fault, the third party would be responsible for the balance of the employee's damages under joint
and several liability.41 Thus, the third party defendant may be responsible for the injured employee's total damages less any compensation benefits even though he cannot later obtain
indemnification from the employer. Although this result may
seem unfair to the third party defendant, the inequity is no
greater than that which already exists in cases where one joint
tortfeasor is insolvent. As the Arbaugh court noted, comparative
37. Arbaugh involved a third party defendant who was 50% at fault, an employer who was also 50% at fault, and a non-negligent employee.
38. Id. at 509, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 614; see also Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366
P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961).
39. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 510, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 608, 615 (1978); Note, Third Party and Employer Liability After Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Companyfor Injuries to Employees Covered by Workers' Compensation,
50 S. CAL.L. REV. 1029 (1977).
40. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1978); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975).
41. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978). Joint and several liability can require the third party defendant to pay more than his proportional share of fault even though he may not
in a subsequent action sue the employer for indemnification. The court felt that
the policy in favor of plaintiff recoveries should be perpetuated over the policy of
liability in direct proportion to fault.

negligence and its companion doctrine, joint and several liability,
are designed to allow plaintiffs an equitable recovery, not to pro42
tect defendants from the consequences of their tortious acts.
Application of the new rule to the negligent employer in
Arbaugh required the employer to contribute, but only up to his
statutory compensation limits 4 3 This enabled the employer to
recoup the benefits expended to the injured employee to the extent they exceeded the employer's proportional share of fault.44
Consistent with comparative negligence, the employer was required to share in the liability but never required to pay more
than his statutory obligation 45 under workers' compensation.
For example, assume that a third party is 50% at fault, the employer is 50% at fault and the employee is free of fault. The employee's total civil damages are determined to be $100,000 and the
total compensation benefits of $25,000 have been paid. Under the
Arbaugh rule the third party would be responsible for $75,000
($100,000 total damages less $25,000 compensation benefits).4 6 In
this case the third party's liability exceeds his actual share of
fault because the employer can only be held liable up to the statutory compensation level of $25,000. Arbaugh held that in these
cases the doctrine of joint and several liability automatically operates to hold the third party liable for all damages not recoverable
from the employer under workers' compensation. 47 The employer
would not have a subrogation claim because the $25,000 already
42. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 507, 145 Cal.

Rptr. 608, 614 (1978).
The legislature also favors employee recoveries. California Labor Code section
3852 grants to employees injured in the course of their employment the right to
recover "all damages". This right may be satisfied in full against any tortfeasor
judgment debtor. The effect is to require the third party defendant to pay the difference between his share of fault and the employer's liability whenever the employer is liable for the monetarily smaller compensation benefits instead of the
difference between the employee's total damages and the third party recovery.
43. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 508, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 608, 614-15 (1978). The court's requirement of contribution from the negligent
employer injected the concept of fault into the employer's liability. This fault concept will not adversely affect the injured employee's recovery nor will it endanger
the workers' compensation trade-off. The employer is simply prevented from taking advantage of his own negligence. The contribution requirement also provides
the employer with added incentive to maintain safe working conditions.
44. Id.
45. In California, the employer's liability is governed by statute. The actual
amount owed to the injured employee is determined by a complex rating schedule
adopted by the Division of Industrial Accidents. See S. HERLIcK, CALIORNIA
WORKIEN'S COMrPENSATION LAw HANDooI, 127-53; Welch, Permanent Disability
Evaluation, in CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA WORKIMEN'S COMPENSATION PRACTICE §§ 15.1-15.49 (1973).

46. See Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 608 (1978).
47. Id.
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paid out in compensation benefits is less than the employer's proportional share of fault which would be $50,000 (50% of $100,000).48
The employer's liability is limited to the lesser of either his statutory obligation or the difference between the employee's total
damages and the amount received by him from the third party.49
In this case, the $25,000 is the lesser of the two. The employee
would receive a total of $100,000 ($75,000 from the third party plus
$25,000 from workers' compensation).50
Assume now the same facts except that the total amount of
workers' compensation benefits paid is $75,000 instead of $25,000.
The result is slightly modified. The third party would now be responsible for $50,000 (50% of $100,000). The third party could not
be responsible for more than his proportional share under joint
and several liability because the employer is required to pay the
difference between the third party liability and the employee's total damages. 5 ' The employer would be responsible for $50,000
(50% of $100,000) of the $75,000 paid in compensation benefits.
Application of the rule in Arbaugh results in employer liability
for the difference between the employee's total damages
($100,000) and the amount received by the employee from the
third party ($50,000) because this amount is less than the compensation benefits paid2 Additionally, the employer would have
a right of subrogation for $25,000 (the extent to which $75,000 ex48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The method for determining damages proposed in this Comment is somewhat different from the method suggested by BAJL BAJI suggests that the
amount of compensation benefits received by the injured employee always be deducted from his total damages to arrive at the amount of third party liability to the
employee. In effect, the BAJI methodology takes a joint and several liability approach to all cases whether or not they specifically warrant it. When only third
party and direct employer negligence is involved, the distinction between the
BAJI method of assessing damages and that adopted by this Comment is strictly
academic; in all cases the result is the same.
However, the BAJI methodology is somewhat shortsighted. If the Arbaugh approach is extended to employee negligence, the method adopted by BAJR will result in a windfall to the third party defendant in cases where all three parties are
negligent. The method of determining liability proposed in this Comment prevents such a windfall. Joint and several liability is applied only in those cases
where it is needed, in all other cases comparative negligence is applied. In this
way a windfall to the third party is prevented and the equity of loss distribution
among the parties is retained. Book of Approved Jury Instructions Committee,
CALIFORNEA JuRY INsTRUCTIONS CIVIL [BAJI] § 15.14 (Supp. 1979).
51. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1978).
52. Id.

ceeded his $50,000 share of the liability) of the third party recovery in order to prevent the injured employee from receiving a
double recovery. 53 The injured employee would receive his full
amount of damages, $50,000 from the third party and $50,000 from
the employer in compensation benefits.5 4 The result is a full recovery of $100,000, not a double recovery in excess of $100,000.
Policy Considerations
This method of apportionment has allowed for a new means to
perpetuate the policies enunciated in Witt v. Jackson5 5 as well as
the policies of workers' compensation and comparative negligence. After Arbaugh, the employer cannot "take advantage of
his own wrongdoing" because he will be liable for his proportional
share of the damages up to his compensation limits. In all cases,
the employer will be required to pay if he is negligent. Thus,
there remains a monetary incentive to be more careful towards
56
his employees in the future.
The Arbaugh decision also balances the conflicting policies of
workers' compensation and comparative negligence. As stated in
Li, the doctrine of comparative negligence is based on liability in
direct proportion to fault.57 The essence of workers' compensation law is a trade-off. The covered employee gives up the right to
sue and accepts instead his employer's guaranteed limited liability.58 The employer accepts liability regardless of fault in exchange for statutory liability limits. 59 While each party loses
some traditional tort rights, the loss is offset by the advantages of
53. Id.

54. Id. Practically, only $25,000 would be received by the injured employee directly from the third party because $25,000 of the third party recovery would go to
the employer through subrogation and the employee would keep the $75,000 compensation benefits. See generally CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3852, 3853, 3856(b) (West
1971).
55. 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961). The court was primarily
concerned with preventing the employer from taking advantage of his own negligence and with preventing an employee from receiving a double recovery. The resulting rule required the negligent employer and third party defendant to share in
liability for the employee's damages.
56. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 CaL Rptr.
608 (1978); Note, supra note 6.
57. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601(a) (West Supp. 1980).
58. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1980).
59. The trade-off in workers' compensation results in two situations under the
Arbaugh approach which may at first appear inequitable. In the first, a non-negligent employee will occasionally not be compensated for his full civil damages.
This will occur whenever the employer is liable for the lesser amount of compensation benefits instead of the difference between the employee's total damages
and the third party recovery. (This is assuming the third party could not be held
responsible for damages in excess of his share of fault through joint and several
liability.) The employee's diminished recovery reflects the workers' compensation
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guaranteed quick recovery to the employee and limited liability to
the employer.
The rule adopted in Arbaugh preserves the workers' compensation trade-off between employer and employee. 60 The employee
continues to be guaranteed speedy recovery of his compensation
benefits regardless of fault. The employer, though required to
contribute, is likewise guaranteed that he will never pay more
than his statutory compensation limits. In accordance with comparative negligence principles the third party's liability is limited
to his share of fault.6 1 The employer cannot take advantage of his
own wrongdoing because he too must contribute either the difference between the employee's total damages and the third party
recovery or his total compensation liability. Employer reimbursement is allowed to the extent his statutory liability exceeds his
share of fault. Finally, the tort policy against double recovery is
upheld. Employer reimbursement automatically prevents a
double recovery due to contribution by the employer which exceeds his share of fault. At most, the plaintiff employee can receive full damages.
Preservation of these policies has resulted in a fair and equitable outcome for all parties. The interest of the third party is
maintained by relieving him of the heavy burden of full liability.
The employer, although required to contribute, maintains his subrogation right and his statutory limits on liability. The employee
benefits by receipt of full damages.62
Arbaugh Approach Followed
In Associated, Construction v. Workers' Compensation,63 the
California Supreme Court adopted and expanded the Arbaugh
trade-off whereby employees agree to accept the employers' limited liability in ex-

change for a prompt guaranteed recovery regardless of negligence.
The second trade-off situation occurs when a negligent employee recovers his
full civil damages. Such a result seems to be inconsistent with Li. But the comparative fault doctrine does not govern the employee/employer relationship. The
employee is guaranteed compensation benefits regardless of his own negligence.

His full recovery results from employer contribution, not from an assessment of
fault under Li.
60. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1978).

61. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
62. See generally Note, .supranote 6.
63. 22 Cal. 3d 829, 587 P.2d 684, 150 Cal. Rptr. 88B (1978).

rule for apportionment of damages, applying it to an employer
credit situation.6 4 As in Arbaugh, the court recognized that the
"development and application of comparative negligence principles has undermined the conceptual basis for the rule of Witt."65
The court ruled that the concurrently negligent employer is entitled to either a credit or reimbursement to the extent his statutory compensation liability exceeds his share of fault. Thus, the
employer's claim will be denied until the ratio of his contribution
to the employee's damages corresponds to his share of fault.66
The Supreme Court's adoption of the Arbaugh rule in Associated Construction necessarily required the court to reject the
method of apportionment proposed by the employer. The employer's proposal requested that the percentage of employer negligence be determined, followed by a reduction in the amount of
employer credit or reimbursement by his percentage of fault. The
employer could then take the reduced amount through subrogation without regard to the extent of prior contribution to the employee's damages. 67
The court recognized that such a rule would exaggerate the employer's already limited liability in many credit circumstances. In
a reimbursement situation the third party defendant would get an
unwarranted windfall.68 Both are undesirable results which are
avoided under the method of apportionment adopted in Associated Construction.
The Associated Construction and the Arbaugh decisions dealt
with employer negligence and how it affected the employer's right
of subrogation. The next logical application of the principles
64. Although the court in Associated Construction dealt with the issue of em-

ployer credit instead of employer reimbursement the California Supreme Court
later specifically applied the Arbaugh rule to reimbursement, in Aceves v. Regal
Pale Brewing Co., 24 Cal. 3d 502, 595 P.2d 619, 156 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1979). The em-

ployer credit situation arises in those cases in which the full amount of compensation liability has not yet been determined because of the possibility of further
employee damage expenses. The employer generally pays through monthly installments up to his share of the liability. To the extent the employer might have
paid beyond this amount prior to the trial determination of his share of negligence, he is entitled to a credit. This credit would be applied against any further
compensation claims the employee might make to defray subsequent expenses related to his injury.
65. Associated Constr. v. Workers' Compensation, 22 Cal. 3d 829, 842, 587 P.2d
684, 691, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888, 895 (1978).
66. Id.
67. Id., Note, supra note 6. This Note discussed the inequitable result which

will occur when the method of apportionment proposed by the employer is applied
to this area of law. The Note also stressed that the policies of workers' compensation and comparative negligence are not maintained under this method of apportionment.
68. Note, supra note 6; see also Kemerer v. Challenge Milk Co., 105 Cal. App.

3d 334 (1980).
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enunciated in these cases is to the area of injured employee negligence, thus creating employer liability for all employment negligence.
APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES WHEN AN EMPLOYEE IS NEGLIGENT

Recently, the issue of employee negligence was taken up by a
California Appellate Court in Kemerer v. Challenge Milk Co.69 In
Challenge Milk, the employee, Mrs. Kemerer, was injured in the
course and scope of her employment. Mrs. Kemerer's injuries
were determined to be caused 30% by her own negligence and
70% by the negligence of the third party defendant. The third
party defendant sought to introduce a "Witt type" defense and
thus reduce his liability to the employer's compensation carrier.
If the third party had been successful, his liability on the employer's subrogation claim would have been reduced by the percentage of negligence imputed to the employer. The result would
have been a windfall to the third party defendant. But the court
refused to allow the employee's negligence to affect the employer's right of subrogation. The employer was reimbursed the
full compensation benefits expended to the injured employee.70
The court began by properly rejecting the defendant's Witt argument that the employee's negligence must be imputed to the employer. As stated previously, the Witt decision was based on the
doctrine of contributory negligence. Adoption of comparative negligence, while not destroying the underlying Witt policy, invalidated the rule imputing employee negligence to the employer. 71
The court next addressed the "strict apportionment" 72 method
of damages. Strict apportionment was previously rejected by the
California. Supreme Court in Associated Construction as yielding
an inequitable result. The court relied solely on the inappropriateness of this method to reject the argument in favor of a new
method of apportionment. There was no discussion of the appor69. 105 Cal. App. 3d 334 164 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1980).
70. Id.
71. See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
72. Note, supra note 6. The strict apportionment method would reduce an employer's liability for compensation benefits in proportion with his negligence. This
injects fault into the otherwise no-fault concept of workers' compensation simply
because a third party's negligence has contributed to the employee's injuries.
Strict apportionment would also reduce a third party's liability by both the employee's and the employer's negligence. The result is a reduction in the employee's recovery to the benefit of the employer and third party.

tionment rule adopted in Arbaugh and how it might affect the
question of employee negligence.
Furthermore, the court in Challenge Milk seemed overly concerned with the policies of comparative negligence. Workers'
compensation principles were never mentioned in the decision.
Also, the triangular relationship between third party defendants,
employers, and employees was ignored. 73 The court in Challenge
Milk discussed only the doctrine of comparative negligence in the
employer/third party relationship. By limiting the discussion of
subrogation rights to the pertinent comparative negligence policies, the court disregarded the basis for subrogation-the workers' compensation statutes. 74 Consideration of these statutes and
the reason they were enacted should have led to a decision and
rule similar to that in Arbaugh.
If the Arbaugh rule of apportionment had been applied in Challenge Milk, the court's objection to altering the employer's right
of subrogation would have been eliminated. The court was primarily concerned with the possibility of windfall to the third party
defendant.7 5 The windfall would occur when the employer's right
of subrogation is reduced by his percentage of the negligence
under the strict apportionment method. No third party windfall
could occur under the Arbaugh method of apportionment because
liability for all parties is linked directly to fault.76
Finally, the Challenge Milk court erroneously relied on Witt v.
Jackson. The holding that compensation benefits must be deducted automatically from the plaintiff's damages to prevent a
77
double recovery is as unsound as the Witt imputation holding.
The Challenge Milk court should have rejected automatic deduction of compensation benefits as it earlier rejected the Witt imputation argument. Under comparative negligence there is no
longer a risk of double recovery in every case.7 8 In those instances when a double recovery is possible the Arbaugh rule provides a preferable solution. Under Arbaugh the employer's right
73. See text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
74. CA. LAB. CODE §§ 3852, 3853, 3856(b) (West 1971).
75. Kemerer v. Challenge Milk Co., 105 Cal. App. 3d 334, 164 Cal. Rptr. 397
(1980).
The "Witt defense" under contributory negligence allowed for a windfall to the
third party for the full amount of compensation benefits. In that case, the court
was not concerned with granting the third party a windfall.
76. Under the Arbaugh method of apportionment the third party is always liable for his proportional share of damages. Although he may at times be subject to
greater responsibility under joint and several liability, he may never pay less.
77. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra.
78. See generally Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500,
145 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1978); County of San Diego v. Sanfax Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 862, 568
P.2d 363, 140 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1977).
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of subrogation automatically prevents a double recovery by allowing the employer a right of reimbursement for the excess
funds.
Employer Liabilityfor Employment Negligence
Before the Arbaugh apportionment method can be applied to
the area of employee negligence, it is necessary to impute the employee negligence to the employer.7 9 The rationale for imputing
employee negligence is that the employer should bear the burden
of all employment negligence. 8 0 Given that the injury in these
cases occurs within the scope of employment, the employee
should be entitled to a full recovery regardless of his negligence.
The nature of the workers' compensation trade-off guarantees employee recovery regardless of fault in return for limited employer
liability. Imputing employee negligence to the employer will not
disrupt this trade-off. In all cases the employer will still be guaranteed that his liability will not exceed his compensation limits.
Neither will imputing employee negligence to the employer adversely affect the third party. His liability will remain as it was, in
direct proportion to fault, subject to joint and several liability.81
There are various methods for imputing the employee's negligence to the employer. In California, respondeat superior imputes employee negligence and fault to the employer, whether or
not there is an independent basis for employer negligence. 82 The
test for application of respondeat superior is essentially whether
the employee was acting within the scope of his employment.
This test is remarkably similar to the test for workers' compensation benefits. 83 In both areas the employer's liability arises from
an injury which results from a risk inherent to the business.8 4 By
79. See generally Kemerer v. Challenge Milk Co., 105 Cal. App. 3d 334, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 397 (1980); Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961).

80. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1978). CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852 (West 1971) provides "the claim of an employee
for compensation does not affect his claim or right of action for all damages proximately resulting from such injury or death against any person other than the employer."
81. CAI LAB. CODE § 3852 (West 1971); Associated Constr. v. Workers' Compensation, 22 Cal. 3d 829, 587 P.2d 684, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1979).
82. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2338 (West Supp. 1980).
83. Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 956, 471 P.2d 988, 88 Cal. Rptr.
188 (1970).
84. Huntsinger v. Glass Containers Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 803, 99 Cal. Rptr. 666
(1972); F. HARPER & F. JAMms, THE LAW OF TORTS 1376-78 (1956). An employer is

placing the ultimate loss on the business through respondeat superior an incentive is provided for the employer to prevent negligence and accidents. The employer has control over the selection
of employees, equipment, and various other factors contributing
to accidents. 85 Consequently, the employer should bear the responsibility for all employment negligence.
Traditionally, respondeat superior has been invoked to protect
third parties, not injured employees. 86 The injured employee is
protected by his workers' compensation benefits, the very nature
of which provides some employer incentive to protect the employee. A stronger, direct incentive to the employer to protect his
employees would result from imputation of negligence through
respondeat superior. This would not allow the employee to sue
his employer for his own negligence; rather it would insure that
the employer's rights against a third party are no greater than the
employee's rights. This proportional reduction in the employer's
subrogation rights would necessarily instill in him an additional
incentive to prevent negligence in the workplace.
An alternative method for imputing employee negligence to the
employer is subrogation. Labor Code section 3852 is the legislative recognition of an employer's equitable right of subrogation. 87
Subrogation is defined as, "the substitution of one for another as
a creditor, so that the new creditor succeeds to the formers'
rights." 88 In workers' compensation this means that the employer
succeeds to the rights of his employee to the extent the employer
has paid compensation benefits. For recovery of this portion of
the employee's special damages, the employer "stands in the
shoes" 89 of the employee. The subrogation scheme for reimbursement of compensation benefits is derivative; in the words of the
California Supreme Court, "essentially the same action."9 0
Under the theory of subrogation, the employer must take responsibility for the employee's negligence because his claim
liable to third parties under respondeat superior because the negligence of his
agent/employee has injured a third party. It is an inherent risk in doing business
that employees may be negligent and as a result injure a third party. The employer impliedly accepts responsibility for this risk under respondeat superior.
The employer is liable to the injured employee under workers' compensation because employment injuries necessarily involve a risk inherent to the business.
85. See Steffen, Enterprise Liability. Some Exploratory Comments, 17 HAST'INGS L.J. 165, 176-77 (1965).
86. W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs 458-59 (4th ed. 1971).
87. Rooney v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
88. WEBSTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY (1977).

89. Brief for Appellee at 19, Garner v. Sagee, No. 47719 (California First Appellate District May 1, 1980).
90. County of San Diego v..Sanfax Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 862, 568 P.2d 363, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 638 (1977).
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against the third party is derived from the rights of his employee.
This assures the injured employee that the employer's rights
against his recovery are no greater than the employee's rights
against the third party; both are reduced by the employee's negligence.
APPLICATION OF ARBAUGH TO

EMPLOYMENT

NEGLIGENCE

Once the employer is responsible for all employment negligence, application of the Arbaugh method of apportionment 9 ' is
relatively simple. The negligent third party remains liable to the
injured employee for all damages that he proximately causes.
Joint and several liability may expose the third party to liability
for the full amount of damages minus the employee's workers'
compensation recovery. 92 The employer will be liable for his and
his employee's negligence whenever the employer must pay the
difference between total damages and third party recovery. 93 The
employer's statutory limits will continue to insulate him from
payment beyond his compensation coverage level. The result is
that the employee will enjoy a full recovery in more cases because he will be compensated before the employer will be entitled to reimbursement.
For example, assume the third party is 50% at fault, the employer is 25% at fault and the employee is 25% at fault. Assume
further that employee's civil damages are determined to be
$100,000 and the total compensation benefits of $25,000 have been
paid. Under the Arbaugh rule the third party is responsible for
$75,000.94 The employer would be liable for the $25,000 already
91. It is significant to note that the Arbaugh rule did not differentiate between
employer and employee negligence. Arbaugh did refrain from limiting the appor-

tionment rule to employer negligence. The court did not require the employer to
pay "his proportional share of the damages". Rather, he was required to pay the
difference between the employee's total damages and the employee's third party
recovery. From this language the rule may be interpreted to hold the employer
responsible for all employment negligence, in other words, because the accident
occurred within the scope of employment, the employee recovers his total damages irrespective of fault. See generally Arbaugh v. Procter &Gamble Mfg. Co., 80
Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1978).
92. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1978). See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578
P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).

93. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1978).
94. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1978). This is an example where the employer is liable statutorily for less

paid in compensation benefits because this amount is less than
the difference between the employee's total damages and the
third party recovery. 95 The employer cannot be required to pay
more because the workers' compensation policy incorporated into
Arbaugh guarantees his liability will not exceed his statutory limits.96 The employer would receive nothing on his subrogation

claim because the $25,000 paid is less than the percentage of employment negligence 97 (25% employee plus 25% employer equals
50% or $50,000). The employee would receive $100,000 ($75,000
from the third party and $25,000 from the employer).98
Assume now that the facts are unchanged except that the workers' compensation benefits are $75,000, all of which are paid. In
this situation, the third party is responsible for $50,000 (50% of
$100,000). The third party cannot be responsible for an additional
amount under joint and several liability because the employer
will be liable for the difference between the third party liability
and the total employee damages.9 9 The employer will be liable
for $50,000 of the $75,000 paid in compensation benefits. In this instance, the $50,000 difference between total damages and third
party recovery is less than the $75,000 statutory liability. The employer, therefore has a right of subrogation for $25,000 (the extent
to which $75,000 exceeds $50,000 in employment negligence) in order to prevent a double recovery. The injured employee will receive a full recovery of $100,000. The employer's subrogation lien
against the third party acts to prevent an employee double recovthan he would be under comparative negligence. Joint and several liability functions in these situations to make the third party responsible for $75,000 ($100,000
total damages minus $25,000 compensation benefits).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Theoretically, the employer, if liable for all employment negligence, would
also be responsible for the negligence of.a co-employee. Where the negligence of
two employees combines with the negligence of a third party to cause injury to
one employee, the employer will be responsible for all employment negligence
(the negligence of both employees as well as himself, if his negligence contributed
to the injury).
98. This would not constitute a double recovery by the employee. The damages collected by him on the basis of fault are $75,000. He has not recovered an
amount beyond that afforded him under comparative negligence and joint and several liability. The additional $25,000 recovery is based on the no-fault doctrine of
workers' compensation. It is awarded because the accident occurred within the
scope of employment. The $75,000 received under comparative negligence from
the third party and the $25,000 received under workers' compensation from the
employer therefore do not constitute a double recovery.
99. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1978). See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578
P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226,
119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Note, supra note 6.
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ery in excess of $100,000.100
The preceding examples have assumed the third party has sufficient assets to pay his judgment debts. The fairness in application of the Arbaugh apportionment method is emphasized in
cases where the third party has limited assets or insurance to pay
his judgment debts.01 For example, assume the third party is
50% at fault, the employer is 25% at fault and the employee 25%
at fault. Assume that total damages are $100,000, full compensation benefits of $25,000 have been paid, and the third party has insurance policy liability limits of $25,000 and no personal assets.
The result would be a third party liability of $25,000. The employer would be responsible for the $25,000 compensation benefits
already paid. 0 2 His liability would not exceed this amount because $25,000 is less than the difference between total employee
damages and the third party recovery. 03 The employer could recover nothing under a subrogation claim because $25,000 is less
than the amount attributable to employment negligence.
The employee would recover $50,000 ($25,000 from the third
party, $25,000 from compensation benefits). Although this sum is
substantially less than the employee's total damages, the
Arbaugh apportionment allows for the most equitable employee
recovery. 04 In this case, if the employer were allowed to subrogate all or part of the third party recovery the employee would receive substantially less money. 05 The employer would be made
100. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1978); see also CAL LAB. CODE § 3852 (West 1971).
101. The occurrence of low policy limits in insurance policies held by negligent
third parties is not uncommon. The effect is to reduce the injured plaintiff employee's recovery. This recovery should not be further reduced by employer sub-

rogation lien until the employer has paid benefits in excess of the percentage of
employment negligence. See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra.
102. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971). This is an example of the workers'
compensation trade-off preserved by application of Arbaugh to the issue of employee negligence. The employee cannot be fully compensated for his damages.

Although the employer has paid only $25,000, an amount less than the $50,000 attributable to employment negligence, the employee can recover no further from

the employer. In exchange for guaranteed prompt receipt of $25,000 compensation
benefits, the employee gives up his right to sue the employer. Id.
103. Note, supra note 6.
104. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1978). Other methods of apportionment do not balance the competing policies
of workers' compensation and comparative negligence. The result is that one or

the other of these doctrines is emphasized. This creates a distorted relationship
between the three parties; one will benefit at the expense of the others.
105. If the employer were to receive any amount on his subrogation lien, that

"whole," at the expense of his injured employee. Such a result is
unconscionable. The purpose of workers' compensation is to compensate and protect employees without exposing employers to
unbearable liabilities. 0 6 Subrogation has been allowed to reimburse the compensation fund to the extent third party liability
would create a double recovery. 07 Yet, subrogation should not be
allowed to reimburse the compensation fund until the injured employee is fully compensated.
The Arbaugh method of apportionment recognizes that the
presence of a third party should not destroy the no-fault nature of
workers' compensation benefits. These benefits should be paid irrespective of fault.108 Under the Arbaugh rule the employer is
granted a right of subrogation whenever the ratio of his contribution exceeds the percentage of employment negligence. 0 9 This
method does not deprive the employee of full compensation;
rather, the compensation fund is reimbursed from excess dollars
which would otherwise result in a double recovery to the employee.
Application of Arbaugh Does Not Create a Double Recovery
Application of the Arbaugh approach to the area of employee
negligence has fostered criticism that an injured employee frequently receives a double recovery.110 However, a careful examination of the nature of the award will reveal that no such double
recovery exists. The triangular aspect of the employee, employer,
third party situation is unique."' Each of the three relationships
is governed by a different set of rules and principles. The relationship between employee and employer is based on a nofault 112 theory. Compensation benefits are paid to employees regardless of fault. This is true even if the employee is totally at
fault. The presence of a negligent third party should not alter this
no-fault relationship.
In contrast, the employee's third party recovery is based on
amount would only diminish the employee's already deficient recovery. The employer would be made "more whole" than the employee at the expense of the employee. To the extent an employer would be allowed subrogation in these
circumstances he would also be allowed to take advantage of his own wrongdoing.
106. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971).
107. Id. § 3852.
108. Id. § 3600.
109. See Associated Constr. v. Workers' Compensation, 22 Cal. 3d 829, 843, 587
P.2d 684, 697, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888, 896 (1978).
110. See generally Kemerer v. Challenge Milk Co., 105 Cal. App. 3d 334, 164 Cal.

Rptr. 397 (1980).
111. Note, supra note 6, at 1051.
112. Id.
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comparative fault." 3 Joint and several liability may, however,
subject the third party to liability over and above his percentage
of fault whenever the employer's statutory liability is less than
his actual share of fault.
The injured employee's recovery is a combination of employer
and third party liability. Although the sum of these two figures
may exceed the amount the employee would recover under the
tort system, this does not constitute a double recovery." 4 Injured
employee recovery is not based on the tort system alone. Compensation benefits are an additional, no-fault, employee recovery
that arises from the nature of the accident and the employment
relationship. Practically, if these funds were treated as creating a
double recovery, fault would be injected into the no-fault system
of workers' compensation." 5 The employee would be deprived of
these benefits whenever his negligence combined with third party
negligence to cause him harm. The employer would be entitled to
reimbursement of these excess workers' compensation funds.
This would allow the employer to rely on his employee's negligence to avoid contribution, a result never before permitted under
6
wbrkers' compensation."
Under the Arbaugh approach, a full recovery is not necessarily
a double recovery. A double recovery is risked in those cases
where employer and third party contribution exceeds the employee's total damages. When this occurs, the employer is
granted an equitable right of subrogation which restores the balance of rights and liabilities between employee, employer and
7
third party."
113. Id.

114. A double recovery occurs only when there is a recovery in excess of damages. This could only occur when one of the parties has contributed more than his
proportional share. A double recovery is prevented under the Arbaugh method of

apportionment by the employer's subrogation lien.
115. See generally Comment, Worker's Compensation/Third-PartyLawsuits:
The Impact of the Li Comparative Negligence Doctrine, 11 U.S.F. L REV. 541
(1977).
116. See Associated Constr. v. Workers' Compensation, 22 Cal. 3d 829, 587 P.2d
684, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1978); Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 369 (1961); Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145
Cal. Rptr. 608 (1978).
117. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1978); Note, supra note 6. But see Comment, Worker's Compensation/ThirdPartyLawsuits: The Impact of the Li Comparative Negligence Doctrine, 11 U.S.F.
L. REV. 541 (1977).

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The Arbaugh method of apportionment not only preserves the
equities between parties, it perpetuates social policy as well. Society favors a strong employer incentive to protect employees and
the public. This incentive is incorporated in the Arbaugh rule.
The employer is encouraged to refrain from personal negligence
because his subrogation rights will be decreased proportionally.1 8 He will only be entitled to reimbursement to the extent he
has paid compensation benefits beyond his share of negligence." 9
Additionally, the employer is responsible for the negligence of his
employees when they or third parties are injured. Liability for all
employment negligence provides employer incentive to choose
diligently, and to urge employemployees carefully, to supervise
20
ees to be conscientious.
Application of the Arbaugh rule to cases involving employee
negligence will also further the policies of loss distribution and
compensation of victims. The losses are more equitably distributed to the public under the Arbaugh rule than under other methods of apportionment.121 The employer is best able to bear the
burden of employment negligence. 22 His decrease in subrogation
rights in proportion to employment negligence will be indirectly
distributed to the public through his workers' compensation insurance. 12 3 This avoids placing the burden on an injured employee with only limited means to spread losses.
The social policy for compensation of victims is strongly supported under the Arbaugh apportionment of damages. The injured employee is fully compensated in more situations than
under other methods of apportionment.124 The third party recovery is not subrogated to the employee's third party recovery until
the employer has paid compensation benefits exceeding the total
employment negligence. 25 The rule favors injured employee recoveries over employment reimbursement through subrogation.
CONCLUSION

The adoption of comparative negligence in Li v. Yellow Cab
118. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr.
608 (1978).
119. Id.
120. See Steffen, Enterprise Liability: Some Exploratory Comments, 17 HAsTINGS LJ. 165, 176-77 (1965).
121. Note, supra note 6, at 1050-1951.
122. Id.
123. See generally CAr. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West 1971).
124. See Note, supra note 6.
125. Id.
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Co. 126 created uncertainty as to the employer's subrogation rights
when either the employer or the employee is negligent. The case
of Arbaugh v. Procter& Gamble Manufacturing Co.12 has solved
this problem with respect to directly negligent employers. The
court held the employer liable for either the difference in the employee's total damages and his third party recovery or the total
compensation benefits paid, whichever is less. 2

8

This requires

the employer to contribute, but not beyond his statutory compensation liability. Consistent with comparative negligence, the employer cannot take advantage of his own wrong. Subrogation is
allowed only when the employer has paid compensation benefits
exceeding his share of fault.
The method of apportionment adopted by the court in Arbaugh
should be applied in cases where the injured employee was negligent. Employee negligence would be imputed to the employer
making him responsible for all employment negligence. The employer's subrogation lien on employee recoveries from third parties would then be denied until his contribution through workers'
compensation benefits exceeds the total employment negligence.
This approach is consistent with the objective of both workers'
compensation and comparative negligence. The employer is required to contribute, yet would pay no more than his workers'
compensation liability. The negligent third party is liable in direct proportion to fault, subject to joint and several liability in
some instances. The employee receives compensation benefits regardless of fault and a third party recovery reduced by his share
of fault. The result is an increased incidence of full employee recovery with the risk of double recovery removed by the employer's right of subrogation.
DEBRA HURST NEILL

126. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 CaL Rptr. 858 (1975).
127. 80 Cal App. 3d 500, 145 Cal. Rptr. 608 (1978).
128. Id.

